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Abstract
Taking its point of departure in the connotations to war and violence inherent in what is here called the ‘lan-
guage of crisis’ (Jantzen), the purpose of this article is to explore what it might mean to reassess the language 
of educational change and policy reform in the imagery of natality and birth (Arendt). If the task in a ‘crisis’ 
is to fi ght against the crisis, eff ectively and forcefully, the argument of the paper is that the root metaphors of 
natality and birth puts into play an imagery that makes possible a relational language for educational change 
and reform. If the language we use has performative consequences, the question explored is what a ‘language 
of natality’ can make possible as a language of struggle for education.
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Introduction: Th e Language of Crisis
Education is in crisis, according to public discourse, and in many Western countries we 
regularly wake up to new alarms. In Swedish daily papers, to take an example, ‘getting 
into teacher education demands less than a randomly answered university test’; ‘results in 
math’s are reaching a new low’; ‘thirteen of nineteen schools fail in their work against bul-
lying’, and ‘lack of discipline and order in schools’ are only some the most recent headlines. 
Getting out of the current crises will be a ‘battle’, it continues, and if anything is going to 
change in the current situation we will have to ‘fi ght bad results’, ‘declare war against the 
lack of order and discipline’ and ‘forcefully combat all kinds of discrimination’. As a direct 
consequence of this ‘language of crisis’, education is debated by well-nigh anyone: it is as if 
the ‘crisis’ has given a green light to politicians to initiate yet another reform and for a wide 
range of professionals – economists, communication strategists, neuropsychologists, jour-
nalists, just to mention a few – to discuss education without having neither theoretical nor 
professional knowledge about the fi eld. 
Th e ‘language of crisis’, however, concerns not only education and the article takes as 
its starting-point the idea that the concept of ‘crisis’ is part of a violent and masculine 
rhetoric that is being used in everyday socio-political discourse to draw attention to, and 
to make sense of, all kinds of diff erent failures. In this sense, the article sees the ‘langue of 
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crisis’ as part of a patriarchal framework and while it would be tempting to believe that 
the masculine rhetoric of ‘crisis’ has a recent origin, everyday discourse has been saturated 
by metaphors of violence, war, and death throughout Western history.1 From modernity 
and onwards, however, as late philosopher Graze Jantzen has pointed out, such metaphors 
were given new proportions and since then a discourse on war and violence has been used 
even in relation to aspects of life where such metaphors should have no place.2 As a conse-
quence of this, we are ‘fi ghting cancer’, ‘battling child abuse’ and ‘issuing war against home-
lessness’ – even a good philosophical debate or discussion is often framed in terms of a 
‘battle’, as in ‘let the better argument win’.3
Th e way out of the crisis in education, the less alarmist voices say, is to focus more on 
the future and what the future can bring in terms of political stability, jobs and economic 
independence. What is needed, in other words, is a focus on what comes after education 
and the consequence of this, as scholars in philosophy of education have critically pointed 
out, is an undermining of education, reducing it into merely an instrument for safeguard-
ing either the future of democracy and/or the future of the market.4 In this sense, the lan-
guage of crisis works against education, reducing education to being about ‘making a living’ 
instead of also being about ‘making a life’ – a distinction used by Säfström and Månsson 
in order to illustrate how the marketization of schools has shifted the governing idea of 
education from being about critical thinking, community building, and emancipation to 
producing well-functioning workers for the job market.5
What I wish to highlight in the above, as a point of departure, is necessarily in broad 
brush strokes and quite programmatic: the ‘language of crisis’ used to motivate change and 
policy reform in education today draws on a whole arsenal (sic!) of images and metaphors 
related to war and violence that has devastating eff ects on education, both on structural 
and personal level. Th e assumption is that the ‘language of crisis’ legitimizes politicians to 
pull into schools with ‘heavy artillery’, initiating by force yet another far-reaching policy 
1 Grace Jantzen, Becoming Divine. Towards a feminist philosophy of religion. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press 1998). 
2 Grace Jantzen, “Flourishing: Towards and ethic of natality”. Feminist Th eory, (Vol. 2(2), 2001), 219-232, https://doi.
org/10.1177/14647000122229497.
3 Jantzen, “Flourishing: Towards and ethic of natality”, 228.
4 In recent years, a vast number of researchers in philosophy of education have been discussing the absurdity of a 
situation where, despite the fact that the future is more unpredictable than ever and clearly beyond our control, 
education keeps being motivated with precisely this: the future. A key text in this regard is Gert J.J. Biestas, Beyond 
learning: democratic education for a human future, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006). For critique of the mar-
ketization of the school, see Gert J.J. Biesta, Good education in an age of measurement: ethics, politics, democracy, 
(London: Routledge, 2016); and Carl Anders Säfström and Niclas Månsson, “Th e Ontology of Learning, or Teaching 
the Non-Person to Learn” in INTERACÇÕES, (No. 37, 2015), pp. 66-82. For another powerful critique of the marke-
tization of the school and for off ering a now widely discussed counter image of what the school might become, 
drawing on the Greek notion of scholè, see Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons’s In Defence of the School: A Public 
Issue (Leuven: E-ducation, Culture & Society Publishers, 2013). 
5 Säfström & Månsson, “Th e Ontology of Learning, or Teaching the Non-Person to Learn”, 74.
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reform.6 Given this background, the main purpose of the paper is to explore what it might 
mean to reassess the language for educational change and policy reform in the root meta-
phors of natality and birth, metaphors that seem to generate what this paper chooses 
to call a language of struggle for education. If the ‘language of crisis’ connotes to war and 
violence and generates an approach to educational reform where the main task is to fi ght 
against the current ills of education quickly, eff ectively, and forcefully, it is central to the 
argument that natality and birth can off er an approach to educational change and reform 
that involves a struggle for education.7 Th ere is much nuancing to be done here, but if the 
language we use has performative consequences and both refl ects and impacts upon our 
material realities,8 the more precise question is what a language of natality and birth can 
make possible as a language of struggle for education.9 
Th e paper is divided into three parts. Th e fi rst part off ers a feminist philosophical con-
text to the ‘language of crisis’, reading its focus on immortality and on the future as a patri-
archal regime that has its roots in a linear understanding of time. Time is also what is in 
focus in Arendt’s famous essay ‘Th e Crisis in Education’ and the second part of the paper 
explores what natality and birth, read as notions of time, can off er a language of struggle for 
education. It is suggested that they; a) interrupt death by interrupting both linear and cycli-
cal time, and; b) alters the relationship between immortality and mortality. Th e argument 
is that ‘the language of natality’ puts into play an imaginary that makes possible a relational 
language for educational change and reform. Th e contribution of the paper is to show what 
this relationality involves and it is suggested that it not primarily off ers a counter-image to 
‘the language crisis’, but an approach to educational change and reform that acknowledges 
both continuation and change, both the old and the new, both the past and the future. 
Hence, the third part of the paper off ers three aspects on how Arendt’s thinking on natality 
and birth can make a diff erence to policy reform in education. 
6 It should perhaps be mentioned here that the last decade in Swedish education is being talked about as the most 
‘reform dense’ period in recent history and that Swedish teachers are suff ering from ‘reform fatigue’. 
7 I owe the playful distinction between crisis and struggle to Marie Hållander, PhD, one of the guest editors of this 
special issue. It might be worth pointing out that the discrepancy between ‘fi ghting against’ and ‘struggling for’ is a 
bit clearer in the Swedish and German languages than in the English language. Whereas a crisis [Sw. kris; Ge. krise] 
is often articulated in the negative and is expected to give rise to ‘counter action’ or ‘defence’, a struggle [Sw. kamp; 
Ge. kämpfen], by contrast, is usually articulated affi  rmatively, as a struggle for something. Th is is why the paper 
articulates the ‘language of natality’ as an affi  rmative struggle for education.
8 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. (New York: Routledge 1997).
9 Quite a lot of research has been done on Arendt’s notion of natality, both within philosophy in general and in 
philosophy of education. In philosophy of education, see, for example; Mordechai Gordon, “Hannah Arendt on 
Authority: Conservatism in Education Reconsidered” in Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing our Common 
World (edited by Mordechai Gordon), (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 2001); Natasha Levinson, “Th e Paradox of 
Natality”, in Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing our Common World (edited by Mordechai Gordon), (Boul-
der, Colorado: Westview, 2001); Natasha Levinson, “A ‘More General Crisis’: Hannah Arendt, World-Alienation, and 
the Challenges of Teaching for the World As It Is”, in Teachers College Record (Vol. 112, No 2, 2010), 464-487. In philo-
sophy in general, see, among many; Grace Jantzen, Violence to Eternity, (edited by Jeremy Carrette and Morny Joy), 
(London: Routledge 2009); Grace Jantzen, “Flourishing: Towards and ethic of natality”. Feminist Th eory, (Vol. 2(2), 
2001), 219-232; Patricia Bowen-Moore, Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy of Natality” (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989). 
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I. Feminist Philosophy and the ‘Language of Crisis’
According to feminist philosophers, the philosophical tradition of the West has been pre-
occupied with death and violence already since Homer and Plato.10 Paradoxically, however, 
the preoccupation with death is spurred on by its opposite, Grace Jantzen argues, that 
is, by an almost obsessive like focus on avoiding death and striving for immortality.11 Th is 
focus on avoiding death and attaining immortality is related to the notion of time, and it 
has taken shape and form in a patriarchal order defi ned by an exaggerated focus on the 
‘otherworldly’: either on life after death or on life before birth or, simply, life in other worlds. 
Luce Irigaray captures this ‘otherworldly’ focus in patriarchy, when she writes:
“Th e patriarchal order is based upon worlds of the beyond: worlds of before birth and espe-
cially of the afterlife, other planets to be discovered and exploited for survival, etc. It doesn’t 
appreciate the real value of the world we have and draws up its often bankrupt blueprints in 
the basis of hypothetical worlds.”12
Generally speaking then, Western discourse has generated an imaginary that in its obses-
sive focus on immortality and ‘worlds beyond’ disregards life in this world – life in the pre-
sent, in the concrete and material place of the here and now – emphasizing instead the 
(ideal) future and trying to attain control over the future. Th is emphasis on the future and 
its simultaneous disregard for the present (as well as for place and materiality), feminist phi-
losophers argue, has had devastating eff ects not only on the lives of women but also on the 
material and physical world more generally. One could in fact argue that there is a direct 
relationship between the exploitation of women’s physical bodies and the exploitation of 
the earth, suggesting, as pointed out by the Swedish journalist Björn Wiman in the Swedish 
daily Dagens Nyheter recently, that the exploitation of the world’s natural resources and the 
exploitation of the female body are two sides of the same coin.13
Th e patriarchal order with its focus on immortality and its dismissal of life in the pre-
sent has ancient roots but it reaches its most disturbing peak in modernity, Jantzen argues, 
erupting in what she calls ‘a masculinist drive for mastery’.14 Th is idea was meant to be the 
theme of a planned six-volume work on Western philosophy, Death and the Displacement 
of Beauty, but only the fi rst volume was completed before she died. In one of her earlier 
books, Becoming Divine, she develops a feminist philosophy of religion and it is here that 
10 Two of the most explicit thinkers in this regard are Grace Jantzen, Becoming Divine. Towards a feminist philoso-
phy of religion. (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1998); and Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Diff erence. 
(London: Th e Athlone Press. 1993).
11 Grace Jantzen, Becoming Divine. Towards a feminist philosophy of religion; Grace Jantzen, “Flourishing: Towards and 
ethic of natality”.
12 Luce Irigaray. Je, tu, nous: Toward a Culture of Diff erence. (London: Routledge. 1993), 27.
13 https://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/kronikor/bjorn-wiman-den-nya-kvinnororelsen-visar-att-allt-kan-forandras-nar-
man-minst-anar-det/ [accessed 2018-02-02].
14 Janzen, Becoming Divine, 129.
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she describes the imaginary of modernity as a violent and ‘death-dealing’ habitus characte-
rizing especially the twenty-fi rst century. She writes:
“From militarization and death camp and genocide to exploitation and commodifi cation 
and accumulation of wealth; from the construction of pleasure and desire to the develop-
ment of terminator genes; from the violence on the streets to the heaven-obsessed hym-
nody of evangelical churches: preoccupation of death and the means of death and deathly 
combat is ubiquitous. It is a necrophilia so deeply part of the western habitus that it emerges 
at every turn.”15
Th e striving for immortality and the disregard for life in the present in modernity also 
comes in a religious variant.16 Th e focus on what in certain religious traditions was refer-
red to as “eternal life” was in the advent of modernity transformed and inverted into a 
pietistic focus on living a vigorous life here and now, coming to the fore – in combination 
with the rise of the industrial, modern society – as a focus on productivity, prosperity and 
progress.17 Heaven on earth was to be implemented in this life or, more precisely, life in the 
present was used as a means to reach the fi nal goal, which was the future, or the life here-
after. Th ere is not enough space to go into this religious variant in much detail here. Th e 
point I wish to make is simply that it seems as if the focus on the future and on immortality 
in modernity, or the urgency to escape mortality by focusing on controlling the future, in 
both its’ secular and religious variants has led to its paradoxical opposite. In other words, it 
seems as if the unbridled focus in modernity on the (better) future and the (illusory) belief 
in the immortality of man has generated a crisis-driven and violent approach to the pre-
sent, onto which man has sought to project an already thought-out and planned future. It 
is, simply put, as if a one-sided focus on immortality and the future, in both its secular and 
religious variants, has led to its opposite: the loss of a (real) future, replacing the arrival of 
the new and unforeseen with old projections. 
In her article “Revolutionary Time: Revolt as Temporary Return”, Fanny Söderbäck 
argues that time is ‘the frame through which we are able to articulate both continuity and 
discontinuity’ and she returns us to the classical distinction between linear and cyclical 
time.18 Men, she argues, have often laid claim to linear time, taking upon themselves to sub-
ordinate nature and the body to culture and reason, whereas women have been relegated 
to the natural realm and to the body and, hence, women have been the bearers of cyclical 
time.19 Th is classical distinction has been the basis for the division of labour throughout 
15 Janzen, “Flourishing”, 228.
16 See Janzen, Becoming Divine and Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2007).
17 Janzen, Becoming Divine, 137-141.
18 Fanny Söderbäck, ”Revolutionary Time: Revolt as Temporary Return” in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society, (2012, vol. 37, no. 2, 301-324), 303, https://doi.org/10.1086/661710.
19 Fanny Söderbäck, ”Revolutionary Time: Revolt as Temporary Return”, 301.
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modernity, and whereas it has associated men with a linear paradigm of progress and pros-
perity and to transcendence, culture, and reason, it has associated women with a cyclical 
paradigm of return and repetition and to immanence, nature, and body.20 According to 
Söderbäck, both linear time and cyclical time belong to the regime of patriarchy, because, 
if linear time tends to forget the past and in this forgetfulness fails to ground us in history 
in a way that provides us with continuity – cyclical time tends only to repeat the past and, 
hence, does not allow for change. In this sense, Söderbäck writes, ‘neither linear time nor 
cyclical time carries true potential for liberation and change’.21 What is needed by contrast, 
she concludes, is a notion of time that allows for both continuation and change. A tempo-
ral movement, she writes, ‘that neither forgets nor repeats the past, a model of time that 
allows us to redeem the past and the present without instrumentalizing them in the name 
of a future always already defi ned in advance’.22 
Söderbäck fi nds resources for such a notion of time in Julia Kristeva’s work, but for our 
purposes here let us turn to Hannah Arendt and explore how time operates in her notions 
of natality and birth. If the ‘language of crisis’ according to feminist philosophy is character-
ized by both a violent approach to change and reform due to its obsession with the future 
and the linear-progressive paradigm, and by a violent approach to the world and life in the 
present due to its desire to escape mortality and create immortality – what can natality 
and birth off er as another way of speaking and thinking about educational reform? Let us 
in the following explore how Arendt’s notions, according to the reading that I do of her 
work here, a) interrupts death by interrupting both linear and cyclical time, and; b) alters 
the relationship between immortality and mortality.
II. Arendt’s ‘Crisis’, Natality and Birth
In an article that takes issue with the notion of crisis, it might seem strange to foreground 
a text in which ‘the crisis’ appears already in the title. We should not be misled by the title, 
however, because Arendt begins her essay ‘Th e Crisis in Education’23 by elaborating on the 
notion of ‘crisis’ itself. In fact, the crisis only turns into a disaster, she argues, if we let it pre-
vent us from thinking and if we – instead of ‘running the risk of failure’24 – respond to the 
questions it rises with a fait accompli, that is, ‘as though the new already existed’.25 Th e main 
risk in a crisis, in other words, is that we pretend that change is already in place and that we 
respond to diffi  cult questions with readymade answers.26 Hence, ‘the crisis’ can create pos-
20 Fanny Söderbäck, ”Revolutionary Time: Revolt as Temporary Return”, 303.
21 Fanny Söderbäck, ”Revolutionary Time: Revolt as Temporary Return”, 308.
22 Fanny Söderbäck, ”Revolutionary Time: Revolt as Temporary Return”, 304.
23 Hannah Arendt, “Th e Crisis in Education”. Between Past and Future. (New York: Penguin Books.1961/1993).
24 Arendt, “Th e Crisis”, 176.
25 Arendt, “Th e Crisis”, 176-177.
26 Arendt, “Th e Crisis”, 174.
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sibilities for change if we do not pretend that the solutions are already there.27 In this sense, 
educational reform is always about taking risks and about carefully navigating towards an 
unknown and unpredictable future. 
a. Natality and Birth: interrupting linear and cyclical time 
Arendt’s notion of natality is inspired by Saint Augustine and his idea that human beings, 
by virtue of being created as new beginnings, can themselves create new beginnings.28 Th is 
ability to begin, she writes, ‘is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man’.29 and 
with this ability to begin, comes the possibility for changing the given course of things (as 
beginners). Hence, at the centre of the notion of natality lies a potentiality for initiating 
change that each of us brings to the world by virtue of our own birth. 
In Arendt’s thinking, our factual and physical birth into the world is used as a root 
metaphor for the notion of natality. In comparison to our physical birth, natality represents 
a second birth ultimately linked to our ability for speech and action in the polis.30 With the 
capacity to begin comes the capacity for changing the given course of things (as beginners). 
Hence, at the centre of the notion of natality lies a potentiality for action that each of us 
brings to the world by virtue of our own birth, of being natals. It is this ability to insert new 
beginnings in the midst of an old world that ‘looks like a miracle’, Arendt writes, and saves 
the world from ruin.31 She continues: ‘Th e miracle that saves the world, the realm of human 
aff airs, from its normal, “natural” ruin is ultimately the fact of natality’32 and because people 
are born, they can themselves ‘give birth’ and create newness. 
What the notions of natality and birth suggest, is that if human beings were left to 
themselves, ‘human aff airs can only follow the law of mortality’.33 But, because people are 
born, they can themselves ‘give birth’ and create new beginnings.34 Hence, natality and 
birth has the capacity to interrupt linear time.35 She writes:
27 Arendt, “Th e Crisis”, 174.
28 Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine. (Chicago: Th e University of Chicago Press 1929/1996) but the inspira-
tion is from Augustine’s City of God [De Civitate Dei], book XII Ch. 20 (Translated by Henry Bettenson, St. Ives: Clays 
Ltd, 2003).
29 Hannah Arendt. Th e Origins of Totalitarianism. (New York: Schocken Books 1948/2004), 616. I am using ’man’ and 
‘him’ here in an inclusive sense, as referring to mankind and to both men and women. 
30 In two of her main political works, Th e Human Condition and Th e Origins of Totalitarianism, natality is discussed 
as a political concept although in ‘Th e Crisis in Education’ natality is also the essence of education. Hence, natality 
is central to both to her political and to her educational work, although she clearly argues that these two realms 
should strictly be kept apart. Th e paper acknowledges this inconsistency in her thinking but it neither seeks to 
resolve it nor explore it further. 
31 Hannah Arendt. Th e Human Condition. Chicago: Th e University of Chicago Press 1998), 246.
32 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 247. It is important to point out in this context that ’the world’ for Arendt does not 
refer to the natural world of trees and animals but to the traces of human words and deeds (speech and 
action) in the polis.
33 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 246.
34 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 246.
35 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 246.
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“Th e life span of man running towards death would inevitably carry everything 
human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and 
beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present 
reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order 
to begin.”36
What is interesting about this well-known citation from Arendt’s Th e Human Condition, 
Adriana Cavarero points out, is that Arendt here reverses the linear lifespan that in Western 
metaphysics runs from birth to death, suggesting instead that the notion of natality as a 
political category off ers us a pattern that runs from death to birth.37 In other words, in 
beginning something new ruin and destruction is interrupted and renewal and restoration 
is moving towards us. Since death is the inevitable endpoint for everything and everyone 
that is alive (i.e. death is our ontological destiny), it is birth that Arendt takes as her central 
category for initiating change. By doing so, Cavarero argues, Arendt not only replaces one 
linear model with another linear model or simply substitutes birth to death as the prefer-
red philosophical category – she actually also changes the pattern.38 By making birth the 
horizon towards which life is heading, the pattern Arendt calls our attention to is that birth 
is more than the starting-point for simply another linear model of time, it is the starting-
point, Cavarero writes, for ‘a journey whose itinerary is not yet identifi ed’.39 Hence, by rever-
sing the perspective in this way, we (the old generation) are on a journey together with the 
new (the beginner and the beginnings) that cannot be foreseen or predicted. 
Is it the case, then, that the interruption of linear time suggested above returns us to the 
cyclical model of time that was immensely popular in Antiquity? Birth and natality easily 
and naturally push us in this direction, Cavarero continues,40 but in contrast to the natural 
circle that in Antiquity was used to symbolize immortal life and the living-on of successive 
generations, ‘man’s life span … looks like a peculiar deviation’.41 
If we return to Arendt’s work we see that what characterizes man’s life span is a ‘rectili-
near movement’42 – a geometrical pattern that neither moves forward according to a linear 
pattern from birth to death (linear time), nor according to a circular movement that moves 
from birth to death and back into rebirth. No, since natality is the capacity to begin and 
since man himself is a ‘beginning of a beginning’, as Arendt puts it,43 – what characterizes 
the human condition is that man is inserted into time. ‘[I]t is this insertion’, Arendt writes, 
‘which splits up the time continuum into forces which then, because they are focused on 
the particle or body that gives them their direction, begin fi ghting with each other and 
36 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 246.
37 Adriana Cavarero, Inclinations. A Critique of Rectitude. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).
38 Cavarero, Inclinations, 111.
39 Cavarero, Inclinations, 111.
40 Cavarero, Inclinations, 111.
41 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 246 in Cavarero, Incliations, 111.
42 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 246.
43 Hannah Arendt, “Preface”. Between Past and Future. (New York: Penguin Books.1961/1993), 11.
33Bergdahl: Crisis or Struggle?
acting upon man’.44 What Arendt off ers in her notions of natality and birth, then, according 
to Cavarero, is a notion of time that breaks with both the linear and the circular patterns. 
She writes:
“In other words, if we confront the ancient fi gure of the circle with natality instead 
of with mortality, beginning comes to the foreground and, by breaking down the cir-
cularity of natural movement, resoundingly interrupts it. Th us it is that the newborn 
breaks out of the circle, together with the human faculty that corresponds to it and 
that actualizes its disruptive force – namely, action.”45
Th e fi rst aspect that the notions of natality and birth bring to the fore then, is that they 
make change possible by interrupting both linear and cyclical time. Th e possibility for 
beginning something new and interrupt the given course of things is what saves the world 
from the path that runs quickly and straight to ruin. 
b. Natality and Birth: mortal man – immortal world
Arendt’s notions of natality and birth not only alters the relationship between death and 
birth and interrupts both linear and cyclical time, it also shifts mortality and immorta-
lity around. If modern life has come to build upon the (illusory) idea that the human can 
become immortal by leaving traces in the world (i.e. the emphasis on power, prosperity 
and progress in modernity), Arendt makes it clear that it is the opposite that is true: since 
we are born into a world that existed long before we made our entry into it and that will 
continue to exist long after we are gone, it is the world that is permanent and immortal 
and not the human being. However, natality and mortality should not be seen as exclusive 
to one another because mortality is ‘the hallmark of human existence’.46 In fact, it is only 
as a mortal, with the capacity for enacting freedom, that man can create new beginnings. 
What Arendt helps us see is thus that although we are born to begin, it is not man that is 
immortal and permanent but the world – it is the world that will over-live us and be passed 
on to the coming generation. 
Modern life, however, according to Arendt, is characterized by the precise opposite of 
this: we have come to believe that we ourselves are immortal whereas the world will perish. 
Th e victory of the philosopher’s exit from the world, seeking the experience of the eternal 
and unchanging over and above the concerns of a life in the polis has, since the myth of the 
cave in Plato’s Th e Republic, come to prioritize bios theoretikos over bios politikos and vita 
contemplativa over vita activa.47 Th e victory of the striving for the eternal and unchanging 
does not, however, only have philosophical roots. Th e fall of the Roman Empire demon-
44 Hannah Arendt, “Preface”, 11.
45 Cavarero, Inclinations, 111-112.
46 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 18.
47 Arendt, Th e Human Condition.
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strated the impermanence of the work of mortal hands and also did the Christian gospel’s 
focus on eternal life for each individual contribute to making any striving for the perma-
nence of the world futile and unnecessary.48 Hence, modern life cultivates an indiff erence 
to the world despite its activism – a kind of wordlessness – given further emphasis, as we 
saw with Jantzen earlier, in the puritan idea of a good life being rewarded in the hereafter.49 
What is important to note here is that whereas the ‘language of crisis’ is motivated by 
the idea that man is immortal but that the world will perish and that man, therefore, can 
use the world as a means to his own ends, the notion of natality builds on the insight that 
the world is immortal and that man will perish. In this sense, the notion of natality not only 
shifts mortality and immortality around, it also reminds us of the immortal and perfor-
mative character of our words and deeds and the importance of language.50 What natality 
rejects, then, is the anthropocentric belief that the world is a temporary arena we can use 
for our own purposes, reminding us that the world will over-live each human being’s tem-
poral existence.
Th e second idea that the notion of natality brings to the fore then is that it shifts mor-
tality and immortality around, suggesting on the one hand that the world is immortal and 
that man with perish but on the other that although we are mortal, we are born to begin. 
Hence, we are neither born to die nor to (ab)use the world as a means to our own ends but 
to insert newness into the world. 
III. Rethinking Educational Policy Reform
Given that natality is about beginning, could it not be argued at this point that the many 
policy reforms that are enforced upon education today are ‘new beginnings’? Could it not 
be argued, therefore, that the last decade in for example a country like Sweden – which has 
been the most reform dense decade in its modern history – generates more ‘beginnings’ 
than ever? We must not forget, however, that an increasing number of teachers today 
describe their situation in schools as being characterized by having no choice. In my job 
as a teacher educator, I meet both teachers and teacher students who express frustration 
over their job situation because, as they often put it, ‘there is no room for doing anything 
beyond what we must do – there is no room for creativity.’ Th e question is then, how can 
we tell an educational reform generated by the ‘language of crisis’ from one generated from 
‘the language of natality’? Or, more correctly: what might policy reforms in education have 
to acknowledge if they were not to foreclose the possibilities for creativity and change? Let 
us look at three aspects on how natality and birth can make a diff erence to policy reform 
in education.
48 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 21.
49 Arendt, Th e Human Condition, 16; 54.
50 See Butler, Excitable Speech.
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a. Educational reform as temporary interruption 
According to Masschelein and Simons, education is the ‘free time’ for study that we insert 
between the sphere of the home and the agora (the public sphere) (e.g. the Greek idea of 
scholè).51 Th e ‘free time’ of the school is thus the ‘space-time’ that makes it possible to break 
with linear time and although what is being taught at school is necessarily oriented towards 
the past, the school as ‘free time’ between the past and future suspends the pre-determi-
nation and one-sidedness that comes with both a conservative and a progressive approach 
where the former tends to focus only on the past and the latter only on the future.52 Th e 
school, as Masschelein & Simons put it, makes free time possible:
“insofar as it succeeds in temporarily suspending or deferring the past and the future, thus 
creating a breach in linear time. Linear time is the time of cause and eff ect: ‘You are this, so 
you have to do that’, ‘you can do this, so you go here’, ‘you will need this later in later in life, so 
this is the right choice and that is the proper subject matter. Breaking through this time and 
logic comes down to this: the school draws young people into the present tense … and frees 
them both of the potential burden of their past and of the potential pressure of a mapped-
out (or already lost) intended future.”53 
For our purposes here, the temporary suspension of the past and the future in school 
creates an important break in time that gives education back, so to speak, to the new gene-
ration. In breaking with linear time, the pre-determined purposes of the school, projected 
onto it through an already defi ned future (as in, saving the future, the economy, the planet, 
democracy etc.) are also broken with. Given the school’s in-betweenness in time, ‘between 
the past and the future’ to speak with Arendt, education is neither about a conservative 
repetition of the past, nor about an unrestrained focus on the future and an anxious and 
death-driven invention of the new. Rather, education is about temporarily interrupting 
time, so as to make possible a space in the present for studying the world. 
What educational reform needs to consider then, if it does not want to simply repro-
duce the violent logic of the crisis, is to take seriously both continuation and change. Hence, 
instead of only using education as a projection screen for implementing an already defi ned 
idea of the future, educational reform needs to take into its concern a respect for what is 
already there, navigating carefully between the past and the future in the present, protec-
ting both the old and the new. Th is is the only way that the next generation of educational 
reformers can interrupt the disastrous crisis in education and truly create something new.
51 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence.
52 For further elaboration on the one-sidedness of both the conservative and the progressive position, see Lovisa 
Bergdahl and Elisabet Langmann, “Time for Values: Responding Educationally to the Call from the Past”, in Studies 
in Philosophy and Education, (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-017-9591-2.
53 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence, 36.
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b. Educational reform as relational consideration
Since the new (the child) is born into an old (pre-existing) world – a world that was there 
long before the new was born – the old needs to be protected from the damage (death) 
caused by the entry of the new, just as the new (birth) needs to be protected and cared 
for so that its newness is not destroyed (killed) by the old. In her advocating of this double 
responsibility, Arendt writes these much cited words:
“Education is … where we decide whether we love our children enough not to expel them 
from our world and leave them to their own devices, nor to strike from their hands their 
chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us, but to prepare them in 
advance for the task of renewing a common world.”54
Th us, the double gesture of the protection and care of both the new and the old comes 
together in education, and the tension between them is always a matter of risk and nego-
tiation. 
Th is leads us to the second aspect of ‘the crisis’ that Arendt draws our attention to in 
her essay on education which is that we tend to use education and our children as a tool 
for building a new world.55 Th e relationship between the old world and the new generation 
is important here and although ‘[i]t is the very nature of the human condition that each 
new generation grows into an old world’, it cannot be the purpose of education to prepare 
the new generation for an old world.56 Why not? Because this could only mean, and this is 
important, ‘that one wishes to strike from the newcomers’ hands their own chance at the 
new’.57 In other words, if the purpose of education were only to socialize the new genera-
tion into the (old) orders of society, then the possibility for renewing the world would be 
lost. So what educational reform concerned with change must do, is to take responsibility 
for both ‘the life and development of the child and for the continuation of the world’.58 Th is 
double responsibility for both the welcoming of the new (change) and the living-on of the 
old (continuation) constitutes a tension in which it is not only the mortal child that needs 
protection; the world, too, is in need of protection to keep it from being overrun by the 
new.59 
Th e second task for everyone involved in educational reform, then, given the ‘language 
of natality’, is to make relational considerations, that is, to keep in tension the relatedness 
between birth and death, the old and the new, the immortal world and the mortal child, 
continuation and change. Th e work to be done, in other words, is relational work since 
54 Arendt. “Th e Crisis”, 196.
55 Arendt, “Th e Crisis”, 176.
56 Arendt, “Th e Crisis”, 177.
57 Arendt, “Th e Crisis”, 177.
58 Arendt, “Th e Crisis”, 186 (emphasis added).
59 Arendt, “Th e Crisis”, 186. Let us remind ourselves again that ‘the word’ for Arendt is not the natural world but the 
traces of human words and deeds.
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there in birth lies a potentiality to kill and where there in death lies a potentiality for new 
life. Th is suggests that birth and death are not worlds apart, as we are made to believe in the 
‘language of crisis’, but that every new beginning necessarily contains an end, and that every 
end necessarily contains a new beginning. Hence, the temporary interruption of the new 
suggests that there is no space for the new beginnings unless the old yields, gives in, dies.
c. Educational reform as risk and hope
Th e basic situation in which education takes place in the present, for Arendt, is that ‘we 
are always educating for a world that is or is becoming out of joint’.60 Because the world is 
made by mortal hands it risks wearing out;’ she writes, and therefore the fundamental task 
for every generation is to constantly set the world right anew.61 Bringing newness into the 
world, then, does not sit easily with wanting to enforce change effi  ciently and smoothly. 
By contrast, it takes time and is risky work. In contrast to the ‘language of crisis’ that makes 
us believe that change can be achieved quickly and once and for all, the work of reform 
generated from the ‘language of natality’ demands continuous and constant navigation 
between diff erent kinds of losses and gains in the knowledge that change always involves 
the necessary and ever-present risk of destruction.
And yet, the fi nal point to make as to what the notion of natality can off er a language 
of struggle for education is hope. Arendt writes:
“Our hope always hangs on the new which every generation brings; but precisely 
because we can base our hope on only this, we destroy everything if we so try to 
control the new that we, the old, can dictate how it will look.”62
Hope in this context, then, is not wishful thinking. Nor is it hope in the ‘fait accompli’, that 
is, in what we can predict and already know the answer to. No, the only hope is the new, 
and to make the new over-live its insertion into the old, we have to refrain from ‘killing it’ 
with our already thought out answers and solutions and protect it from being overrun 
(by the old). Th is double gesture of distance and proximity is a gesture that, in contrast to 
control, takes a step back. It implies simply, as Natasha Levinson puts it, that ‘[t]he results 
of eff orts are always uncertain’.63 Hoping beyond certainty, then, as a way of initiating edu-
cational reform, is about a precarious navigating between a ‘no longer’ and a ‘not yet’: bet-
ween what education can no longer be (identifying a need for change) and what it could 
become (formulating a vision). Th e bottom line of this hope is that we are not doomed to 
subject to a fi xed order of things. 
60 Arendt. “Th e Crisis”, 192.
61 Arendt. “Th e Crisis”, 192.
62 Arendt. “Th e Crisis”, 192. 
63 Natasha Levinson, ”Th e Paradox of Natality: Teaching the Midst of Beleatedness”. In Hannah Arendt and Education: 
Renewing our Common World, (Edited by Mordechai Gordon, Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 32.
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Conclusion: A Language of Natality for Education
Th e work required by the the kind of reform that has the struggle for education close at 
heart, is that it breaks with automatism and ‘one-way-routes’ and takes the necessary 
unpredictability that comes with birth and beginnings seriously. Hence, in contrast to a 
situation where educational reforms are powerfully and forcefully initiated, often moti-
vated by a one-sided logic that leaves no room for thinking and nuancing, the notion of 
natality challenges us to think carefully about what needs to be changed, what needs to be 
preserved, when, why and how. 
Drawing on natality and birth as root metaphors for educational reform, however, 
should not be understood as simply a way to create an oppositional imaginary to the ‘lan-
guage of crisis’. Rather, it has been the aim of this article to show that the ‘language of nata-
lity’ – as a language of struggle for education – calls for a relationality in thinking and acting 
that is foreclosed in the violent logic of the ‘language of crisis’. Th is relationality – and this is 
the gist of the paper – needs to be taken into account when initiating educational change 
and reform if the new is to over-live the weight of the old.
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